Boko Haram Insurgency: A Need To Re-Think Nigeria Borders Security Doctrine And Operations – By John Danfulani Ph.D

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is passing through tough security challenges masterminded by activities Islamic terror groupJama’atuAhlisSuna Lid Da’awatiWal Jihad (a.k.a BOKO HARAM). The sole mission of the dreaded gang is establishment of an Islamic theocracy pillared on the 7^thCentury Wahhabist philosophy through forceful overthrow of the State. Boko Haram’s first open confrontation took place town called Kanammain the country’s north-eastern State of Yobe(Adeniyi,2011). Other lethal clashes were staged between the group and Nigeria Armed Forces which resulted to annihilation of their spiritual leader Sheik Mohammadu Yusuf along with his top spiritual comrades (Gorman, 2009). Sheik Yusuf’s killing by men of Nigeria Armed Forces after capturing and parading him hands tied to his back before cameras has been labelled by the country’s Human Rights Community and a section of the press as extra judicial killing. Calls have been made for a full investigation of this allegation, the Federal Government responded by forming a committee to look into claims of the group and their supporters in the Human Rights Community(  PressTV,5^th August 2009 ).

The bloody encounter that annihilated the Sheik and other top commanders inflicted a temporary set-back to Boko Haram and forced them to change their strategy and tactics of warfare. Their delusional and phantom tantrum of believing that they can square off with the country’s Armed forces frontally and directly bowed to reality of existing disproportionate might and combat experience between them and a force that once fought a 30 months civil war and participated in many successful peacekeeping operations in the continent and beyond (Agbese,2013). The forces the terrorist challenged are one of a few in the black world with the robustness and capability of projecting their national forces to other countries without the support of any known force in the world.

Surviving commanders of the terror group went underground for a while and reappeared with a multifaceted strategy of suicide bombings of worship centres, selected military zones, buildings and public squares, and highway banditry in tandem with modusoperandi of terrorists’ campaigns (Meehan and Spier 2011). Introduction of these guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run and bombings caught Nigeria Armed Forces off guard because it was something outside the bracket of their training and imagination. This gave the enemy an advantage and chance to execute their heinous acts of terror on their targeted victims with impunity. Within this period of re-emergence of an Improved Boko Haram brigade, both military and civilian zones were not immune; Nigeria Police Headquarters, Nigeria Command and Staff CollegeJaji, and others became easy targets and  were successfully attacked(  Vanguard 25^th November 2012).

Other features of Boko Haram’s campaign are banks and highway robberies. Many banks in the north especially in north eastern cities of Nigeria were robbed and millions of local and international currencies carted away. Similarly, some of their combatants blocked highways and international tracks linking the country and neighbouring countries and robbed commuters engaged in intra and inter Statescommerce. Because of poor and inadequate banking system in the country, most of these businessmen shuttle with large sums of local and foreign currencies for their trading. Both the highways and banks robberies are to provide financial support for their Holy War against the state and believers of other faiths. This became necessary because of the need to fund their Jihad and also support their large families they left in cities and villagesfor Allah’s service and propagation of his will in Nigeria through force(Sahara Reporters 6^th July 2013).

Efforts were made by notable Islamic clerics and senior citizens to broker peace between Boko Haram and the Federal Government to no avail. All through, Nigeria Government expressed willingness to sit on the table and talk with the group. The Federal Government unilaterally declared amnesty and formed a committee to work out the modalities of an amnesty programme like what was done for the Niger Delta Militants (News Express, 4th April 2013).  Imam Shekau via a YouTube message refused the Federal Government’s carrot dangling policy and vowed to continue with his campaign against the State (Vanguard Newspapers 11^th April 2013). His refusal message, continued terror activities, and supplanting of their flag in remote Local Governments along Nigerian borders with Chad and Niger pushed the back of Nigerian Government to the wall. On 4^th April 2013 the President and Commander-in-Chief of Nigeria Armed Forces declared a State of Emergency on three north eastern State of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and ordered the Armed Forces to cleanse up the states of Boko Haram insurgents (News Express 4^th April 2013). The Presidential emergency declaration marked the beginning of another phase of open military confrontation with the group. Terror combatants have been flushed out of their training camps and bases in the three States; they are now over borderlines of neighbouring countries and sneaking in through thousands of illegal entry points to hit targets and dash back to their bases across the borders.

As the war against terror progresses, a rather strange phenomenon appeared, which is; the presence of foreign fighters among the ranks of the Jihadists. This was confirmed by surviving victims of their highway banditry and banks robbery who saw their distinct biological features and heard their different ascent of Hausa language while on operations. Hausa language is spoken in all the neighbouring countries and in most of the West African countries,but there are minor differences in pronunciations. The version of Hausa used in Nigeria is the Kano version. Other dependable sources that gave support to this claim of the presence of foreign jihadists were captured combatants and dead bodies seen in theatre of war. Nigeria Armed forces have severally paraded live combatants or dead bodies that are not Nigerians(Nigerian Tribune 19^th September 2011).  It is difficult to ascertain the number of foreign combatants involved in planning and execution of their assaults and confrontation with the armed forces in the north-eastern Nigeria and other spots in other northern parts of the country because of the unconventional nature of how they conduct their affairs (National Mirror 27^th February 2013).However, this brought the issues of bordersmanagement by agencies charged with manning the country’s legal and illegal borders to the fore.

Complete defeat of Boko Haram Jihadist by Nigeria Armed Forces despite presidential orders to use all necessary might to liquidate them is proving a hard nut to crack because of the porous nature of the country’s borders and thousands of illegal entry points with neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republics. Apart from operational quandaries these poorly demarcated borders are posing, international protocols prohibiting sending forces in pretext of hot pursuit beyond a certain limit into neighbouring territories are yet another cluster of quagmires. It is a tight rope to walk because if not properly done, it can lead to clashes with forces of neighbours in their own territories. If that happens, Nigeria Armed forces will face two foes, simultaneously. And that again could ruin bi-lateral relations existing with neighbours that their complete cooperation is highly desirable in the war against Jihadists operating across the borders.

FEATURES OF NIGERIA BORDER

There is no universally acceptable definition of borders because of its concomitant perspectives and connotations and typology.  Much of the difficulties associated with definitions originated from varieties of borders and contextual usage at any point in time. There are administrative, economic, social-cultural, national, international, regional, military,and sub-regional borders. In this study, we are focusing on international separating lines or zones between sovereign States. A border is a demarcating line or zone between two or more independent states and these borders can be categorised into sea, air and land borders. Nigeria is one of the luckiest States in Sub-Sahara Africa to have sea, air and land borders.  Sometimes rivers, valleys, oceans, and some distinct geographical features are used as demarcating lines of the end and beginning of territories of States.

Nigeria is a West African State with a vast expanse of land covering an area of 923,768 square kilometres with about 13,000 square kilometres of water stretching from the coastal city of Lagos up to the semi desert state of Maiduguri to the North-East and Sokoto to the North West. Nigeria shares common boundaries with BeninRepublic (773 kilometres), Cameroon (1,690 kilometres), Niger Republic (1,497 kilometres), and Chad Republic(87 kilometres) and Islands Sao Tome and Principe. Some areas in the southern part are bounded by the Atlantic Ocean, the rest are land borders.Nigeria’s Coastline along the Gulf of Guineatotals 853 kilometres.(www.mongabay.com/reference/new_profile/183ng.hmtl). Through nature and mans’ scientific knowhow the country has sea, air and land borders with land entry points constitutes over 99% of the borders, and followed by airports.

 Like most borders created by Europeans imperialist in the Black World, they are poorly demarcated with titanic quagmire of comprehending and accepting where the dividing contours falls and which settlement belongs to State A or B. Division of conquered territories among great European powers of 17^th, 18^th, and early 19^th centuries in 1884 BerlinGermany did not take cognisance of many variables, and that has created a major source of inter-states skirmishes in post-colonial era in Africa(Dahou, 2004). It has been reported that many houses or settlements along inter-States borders often have some sections in one State and some in another. A clear example of this mix-up is the BankiMosque on Nigeria-Niger Republic border, the Southern entrance is within a portion recognised to be within Nigeria territorywhile the Northern entrance is in Niger Republic (Achibong, 2012). This scenario of settlements in two States through building on borderlines is not peculiar with Niger-Nigeria borders but in all other borders shared with neighbouring States.

Borders along the Riverine State ofBayelsa are characterized with rivers, streams and the ocean. Crisscrossing them is more herculean than other land borders. Settlements and moving pattern is quite different and difficult because of the geography which has more water than land. The many rivers, streams and ocean provided a clearer demarcation line between Cameroon Republic and Nigeria. This also made movement of goods and persons low due to factors like climate and lack of advanced means of water transports in the areas. Transportation is still done with local canoes, on foot, and small bridges linking various parts. In situations of heavy rains the rivers overflow thereby denying dwellers of such areas the capacity to cross to either side.

Nigeria borders are centres of trans-borders trades where nationals of Nigeria and bordering States import and export goods with minimal restrictions. Most of these entry points are big settlements with two tolls checking entries and exits of persons and goods. Currencies of the two States and others are exchanged without regard to existing currency policies of the nations or regions. Demand and supply dictates the value of all currencies on exchange in these borders (Nte, 2011). Currency traders in these borders are competing with many banks situated along the borders for such and allied services. Legal and illegal businessmen finds going to the banks unpalatable and inimical to their businesses due to protocols and security measures demanding full disclosures of  the nature of their activities  and  appropriate taxation.  Where customers have a large quantum of money they cannot handle, currencies traders help them by crossing over with the cash to any side of the border desired.  Legal and illegal businesses along Nigeria and its neighbours borders runs into hundreds of millions of dollars annually (ThisDay Live, 27^th October 2013).Yet, very little taxes are accruing to public treasuries of the States.

Another feature of Nigeria borders is its thousands of entry routes and few legal points. The federal government of Nigeria admitted this fact through a press interview the minister of Internal Affair on 5^th January 2013, the Minister estimated these illegal routes to 1,497(National Mirror 6^thFebruary 2013) .  Internal Affairs disclosurecomplimented official reports of Nigeria Immigration Service which had a figure a bit higher than what their supervising minister said. Lt. Col Sagir Musa a Joint Task Force officer  fighting insurgents in North East piqued “there are well over 250 footpaths from Damaturu/Maiduguri axis that link or lead direct to Cameroon, Chad, or Niger” (Musa, 2013). There are less than one hundred legal entry routes alongside over fifteen hundreds illegal posts.  Goods and persons move in and out of these on foot, on bicycles, motorcycles, donkeys, boats, and small ships. And means enumerated above constitutes major avenues where legal and illegal goods and persons slip in and out of Nigeria (Nte, 2011).

NIGERIA BORDERS MANGEMENT

 However, thedeadly terroractivities of Boko Haram jihadists  and unprecedented preponderance of cross- borders criminalities has added the phenomenon of Special Task Forces of Nigeria Army (NA),  Nigeria Air Force (NAF), State Security Services(SSS), and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corp (NSCDC) to forces overseeing Nigeria borders. The involvement of bodies without traditional mandate in borders management was masterminded by the desire to compliment paramilitary forces charged with manning the country’s borders and securing the country from terror and crime.

Each of thesebodies conducts its activities within the jurisdiction permitted by legal frameworks establishing them, constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria and International, regional, and sub-regional protocols. The chain starts with Immigration, customs, Drugs laws enforcers, and finally Nigeria Police. Nigeria Immigration handle matters related to entry and exits of persons and papers related to residency and duration of stay of such aliens in the country. Immigration also scrutinise travelling documents of Nigerians exiting to other countries to ascertain the validity of their visas and other travelling documents. Nigeria Customs Service’sprincipal schedule is checking goods, and classified their legality or otherwise. They confiscate contraband and tax others placed under the list of non-essential goods. Nigeria Drugs Law Enforcement Agency also screen travellers and their goods to see that no globally banned substances are allowed to come in or go out of the country. Nigeria Police helps in maintaining law and order, the also have stations along the borders. All the four key agencies in borders management have powers of arrest and prosecution of Nigerians and aliens that crossed the red line of the law through illegal entry or importation ofcontraband goods. These layers of checks form the back bone of Nigeria borders management in all the legal entry points erected by the government of the country.

Apart from this routine conducted within zones demarcated as entry posts, these forces embark on patrol of long porous borders in an attempt to keep faith with legal frameworks that established them and duties assigned by Nigeria constitution. Patrol vehicles, boats, foot are major means of their patrol of Nigeria Sea and land borders. Nigeria Police have helicopters but they are for internal security surveillance and transporting of their men and officers.

CHALLENGES OF BORDER MANGEMENT IN NIGERIA

Border management in Nigeria is surrounded with multifaceted quagmires that have made effective management a tall dream or a mountain climbing endeavour. The features of the borders, inadequate manpower of Para-military bodies charged with manning borders, poor training of personnel, lack of modern equipment, and presenceof international and sub-regional protocols of free movement of persons constitutes a cog in the wheel of effective management of land, sea, and air borders in Nigeria.

Nigeria shares common borders with four Republics and a coastline area of 853 kilometres along the Gulf of Guinea with rough demarcated edges that made claims of many by settlementsdifficult. These borders are porous with almost One Thousand Five hundred (1500) illegal entry and exit routes and less than one hundred official entry tolls. Some of these borders are in very difficult terrains like the water and mountains and deserts which are hard for movement and survival of human beings. More to this problem is the settlement pattern along the borders which made knowing which area falls within Nigeria territory or that of neighbouring states hard like rocket science. This uniquenessconstitutes a gargantuan hurdle in effective management and securing of the borders by institutions on which responsibility of managing them is rested.

Para-military forces lack equipment to effectively discharge their duties. Most of them are forces saddled with obsolete working tools or gadgets in tandem with the global trend. There is no denying the fact that they still move around in old trucks that are not roadworthy talk less of plying difficult and dangerous terrains on patrol or pursuit of trans-borders criminals cutting corners to evade them and the law. A clear example of lack of modernization of the force is their inability to maintain functional websites where basic information about their organisations can be found.  Another case is poor documentation of passports by NIS of which people often found their names totally missing from their data bank. In extreme cases, you find people with two or three passports issues by the same department of immigration in the same branch or regional office. Surveillance cameras, speedboats, body scanners, helicopters, motor bikes, automatic rifles, communication gadgets, are modern laboratories are either in short supply or non-existence. Very easy cum cheap means of transportation like donkeys, patrol dogs, and bicycles are also scarce commodities these bodies are incapable of acquiring or keeping. This is contributing heavily to lack of efficiency and effectiveness in managing and securing Nigeria borders from influx and exit of criminals and illicit traders.

Lack of adequate training of personnel of these Para-Military agencies has been identified as another problem making border managers walk the tight rope while executing their duties. Most of them are defective in modern techniques of effective patrol, investigation of crimes, and other professional activities. This is denying them the knowhow of coping with rising trans-borders criminal activities taking place in both legal and illegal routes. Lack of training is also linked to existence of low morale and character in these institutions, men and women of the Para-military units don’t give in their best because they believe they deserved a better working condition and equipment. Year in year out local and international training and re-training appeared in their appropriations but is either they run short of cash backing or corruption amongst the top brass hinders such trainings from happening. Problem of training has internal and external dimension.

It is also evident that there is gross shortage of manpower considering the nature of the long borders and difficult terrain. As stated in the first section of this discourse, some of these forces have less than six thousand men and women. The largest force is Nigeria police with a total force of over three hundred thousand officers.  Without any serious analysis it is clear that they have staff strength that is not sufficient to adequately tackle their administrative routines in their headquarters and regional offices. Nigeria Police which is the largest and with the principal schedule of maintaining and  enforcing law and order are short of officers to man streets not to even think of sending sufficient number to secure the country’s long and difficult hilly, swampy, forests, and Sahara desert bounded borders. This shortage of manpower is showing in their incapability to discharge their duties of securing the borders and taming illegal entry and exit of goods and persons in Nigeria effectively.

NEW MEASURES AND OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES

Little effort is needed to know that agencies bestowed with the onerous task of securing Nigeria difficult borders are besieged with multidimensional quandaries. If they must effectively and efficiently discharge their constitutionally assigned duties, a holistic overhaul of their modes of operation is necessary.

CONCLUSION

For Nigeria to win its present war against Islamic terror group Boko Haram, the country’s borders must be tightly manned to hinder illegal influx and exit of insurgents through usage of over a thousand unofficial routes bordering four different countries. If Nigeria’s borders are not properly secured, the war with Boko Haram will linger for an unforeseeable period because of challenges associated with their cross-borders activities because they will continue to use their bases outside the country to hit and run back to their save havens.

Another way that will make the war on terror in the North-Eastern corner of the country effective is through initiating bi-lateral protocols that will permit Nigeria Armed Forces to go on hot pursue that will allow them cross the border lines into neighbours divide in the process of fighting. The protocol should also solicit help from forces of the neighbours through manning their borders and helping when Nigeria armed forces cross borderlines in pursue of Boko Haram.

War on terror is by all means not a tea party and a war very difficult to fight by even the most advanced nations with robust forces, effective intelligence gathering, and modern tracking gadgets. It is also too costly for nations to prosecute because of other competing needs. However, survival of the nation and wellbeing of million is citizens is paramount and far above any other national need.

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Dahou, K. (2004): Towards an Euro-African Dialogue on Cross Border Cooperation: A Study Completed for the Secretariat of the Sahel and West Africa Club

Gorman, G. (2009): Islamist Violence Grips Northern Nigeria: in the Long War Journal

Meehan, P& Speier, J (2011): Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the US Homeland? : US House of Representative Committee on Homeland Security and Sub-Committee on Counter Terrorism and Intelligence.

Musa, S. (2013): Border Security, Arms Proliferation and Terrorism in Nigeria. An Article Published in Sahara Reporters, April 20, 2013

Nte, N.D. (2011): Transnational Threats and National Security Concerns; A Study of Nigeria-Benin Republic Border in International Security Journal. No. 1, Issue 1, 2011.

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