JERUSALEM: Israel has responded to the failure of the latest nuclear talks between world powers and Iran with a familiar refrain: sanctions must be ramped up while the clock ticks down toward possible military action.
With diplomacy at an impasse, there is satisfaction among Israeli leaders at what they see as a tough line taken by the West in the negotiations on curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Israeli political sources said on Thursday. A member of the British negotiating team quietly visited Israel on Wednesday to brief officials on this week’s Moscow talks, the sources said, and new US and European sanctions against Iran are due to come into effect in the next two weeks.
Defence Minister Ehud Barak stuck closely to his stated line, without offering any new sense of urgency, when asked by the Washington Post how much more time Israel can allow for diplomacy to work. “I don’t want to pretend to set timelines for the world,” he said, “but we have said loud and clear that it cannot be a matter of weeks but it (also) cannot be a matter of years”.
Preparations for any strike against Iran, which Israel and Western powers suspect is trying to develop the capacity to build a nuclear bomb, are closely guarded in Israel. But Barak said that even in the United States, which has counselled against jumping the gun while a diplomatic drive with Iran is under way, “at least on a technical level, there are a lot of preparations”.
Iran and six world powers – the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany – failed to secure a breakthrough in Moscow at what was the third round of the latest diplomatic initiative, and set no date for more political talks. Last month, and again in Moscow, the powers asked Iran to close the Fordow underground facility where uranium is being enriched to 20-percent fissile purity, and to ship any stockpile out of the country, demands that come close to Israel’s.
Israeli Vice Premier Shaul Mofaz held talks with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington on Wednesday.
Meanwhile, the Iranian navy has announced plans to build more warships and increase its presence in international waters at a time of growing tension in the Middle East over Tehran’s nuclear programme. Navy commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari said the deployments would protect Iranian cargo ships around the world, in particular in the Gulf of Aden and the northern part of the Indian Ocean, according to state news agency IRNA. The navy wanted to guard Iranian ships from Somali pirates, the report said.
IRNA did not mention Israel although the Jewish state has hinted it might take military action against Iran’s nuclear programme. An Israeli official repeated the veiled threat on Wednesday following the failure of the latest round of international talks to make progress on the issue. State-owned Press TV quoted Sayyari as saying: “Our presence in international waters is aimed at safeguarding the interests of the Islamic Republic and strengthening military power to defend Iran.”
In 1994, Martha Crenshaw’s edited volume Terrorism in Africa made clear how terrorism – generally defined as a tactic that uses violence or the threat of violence as a coercive strategy to cause fear and political intimidation – was a feature within resistance movements, military coups, political assassinations, and various intra- and inter-state wars that have affected most African states at some point during the continent’s transition to independence and subsequent post-colonial period. Crenshaw further noted that terrorism was not “an isolated phenomenon” for African states or the region more broadly [1]. This description remains salient today: terrorism has been a global phenomenon for many decades, and Africa has not been unscathed by it. Terrorism is just one of several types of political violence that states and their citizens, in Africa and elsewhere, have had to grapple with. In fact, from a macro perspective, terrorism may not be universally seen as the most important security challenge faced by African states and their citizens. Famine, drought, endemic poverty, diseases and other natural and man-made disasters that undermine human security have also been at the forefront of recent policy discussions on Africa among Western governments and international aid organizations. It is thus necessary to place terrorism within the broader terrain of Africa’s security challenges, before examining the historical trends and specific examples discussed in this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.
To be sure, Africa has its own peculiar domestic collection of ideologically-inspired violent non-state groups that are responsible for periodic bouts of murderous mayhem. Some of these, like the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, have attracted ample media attention. Yet in addition to terrorist groups, there are also irresponsible governments that have employed the tactics of terrorism in (for example) a brutal crackdown against opposition leaders in Zimbabwe, or the Eritrean government’s support (according to a recent UN report) for terrorist plots against African leaders gathering in Ethiopia. President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan is the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, while in the newly independent South Sudan, locals are calling for a war crimes investigation. In Senegal, riots erupted in the streets to protest President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempt to change the constitution in an effort to be elected to another term in office. Add to that the tragic episodes of genocide in places like Rwanda and the Darfur region of Sudan and you have a first glimpse of the atrocities that the present African generation has witnessed.
With this caveat in mind, our intention in assembling this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism has been to draw attention to contemporary issues and trends in order to promote further research and policy interest in the terrorism challenges faced by Africa today. In addition, we recognize that this publication comes at time when the world looks back on the 9/11 attacks and reflects not only on the impact of this event but also looks at the current state of the terrorist threat. Without question, the future of Africa’s security and the role that terrorism will play in particular is especially pertinent given the combination of the unfolding revolutions and political transformations in North Africa and what appears to be a transforming, if not growing, Islamist terrorism threat in sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country, Nigeria. Against this backdrop, this introductory essay will review a handful of important themes related to political violence and terrorism in Africa, including domestic and international trends, and the ways in which politically violent and terrorist groups finance themselves, organize and operate, and communicate (both internally as well as externally). We conclude with some brief observations regarding the challenges and opportunities for countering the terrorist threat in Africa, and then introduce the remaining articles in this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.
Indigenous and Foreign Dimensions of Terrorism in Africa
Contemporary and historical scholarship on terrorism in Africa, particularly since the early post-colonial years, has highlighted themes of international terrorism (which emerged most prominently during the 1970s) as well as domestic incidents where terrorism was employed. In terms of the former, Africa has played a role in several high profile terrorist events and movements that originated in other parts of the world. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was felt in East Africa when in June 1976 Palestinian terrorists hijacked a commercial Air France plane carrying 248 passengers and took it to Entebbe, Uganda. While this event was quickly resolved through a raid carried out by the Israeli Defense Forces, it nevertheless illustrated the intersection of transnational terrorism and the African continent. It bears mentioning that four years later, in apparent retaliation for Israeli troops being permitted to refuel in Nairobi during the Entebbe raid, the Jewish-owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi was bombed by terrorists linked to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, killing at least 15 people and injuring 80. Meanwhile, in North Africa, Libyan ruler MuammarGaddafi was well-known for his support of anti-Western terrorist organizations – providing support in one form or another to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades [2] as well as groups in Africa and other regions. His connection to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 (otherwise known as the Lockerbie bombing) resulted in broad UN sanctions. These lasted until 2003/2004 when Libya agreed to pay £2.5 million to the family of each victim in exchange for ending the UN arms and air embargo. [3] And, lastly, we should not forget the role that the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood (MB) played in the Islamist ideology that has come to inspire many neo-jihadist groups today. In the 1960s, MB theologian Sayyid Qutb laid the foundation for the religiously justified violence that has repeatedly expressed itself today in various terrorist movements, Al-Qaeda being but one example.
Of course, terrorism has also been employed during many domestic state and non-state campaigns within Africa throughout the last half century. Examples of violent non-state actors include the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Eritrea, and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa – to highlight just a few – which incorporated terrorist tactics within their modes of conflict waging. [4] For instance, through its military wing “Umkhonto we Sizwe” (‘Spear of the Nation’), the ANC publicly sought to rationalize its use of terror tactics in its campaign against the Apartheid regime. In 1969, it specifically called for opposing the “political, economic, and social structure of South Africa by means of political subversion and propaganda and sabotage and terrorism.” [5] During the 1980s, the ANC was responsible for several large-scale terrorist attacks, including the May 1983 car bombing that took place on a busy street in Pretoria, near the office block housing South African Air Force personnel. [6] As a result, 19 people were killed and more than 200 injured. Along similar lines, car bombs were used in two attacks carried out in 1984 and 1985 that also resulted in numerous casualties.
At the same time, state-sponsored terrorism was a common feature in the Rhodesian bush war and more recently has been used by Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe to silence dissent and maintain power. In the former, during the 1970s the Selous Scouts emerged as a counter-insurgency unit amidst the domestic Zimbabwean nationalist insurgency that sought the removal of the White minority rule government (3% of the population was European, 1% mixed race, and the remaining roughly 95% were from the Shona or Ndebele tribes). [7] With the Zimbabwean nationalists receiving foreign assistance and the Rhodesian Army lacking domestic support from the population, the Selous Scouts were created as a mixed-race unit to infiltrate insurgent territory and carry out activities that sought “the clandestine elimination of terrorists/terrorism both within and without the country.” [8] To target nationalist fighters, they utilized asymmetric warfare tactics which ranged from bombing civilian homes, raids on insurgent camps, abductions and sabotage of transportation infrastructure. [9] The bush war ended in 1979 with a subsequent transition to majority rule in 1980 whereby Robert Mugabe was elected to power and continues to rule the country (re-named Zimbabwe) up to this day. However, in recent years it appears as though Mugabe, in his quest to maintain a one-party state under his rule, has adopted some of the tactics employed by the Selous Scouts. In fact, his preferred use of violence to maintain power became already clear in 1976 when in a radio broadcast from Mozambique he declared: “Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have shall have been the product of a gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins”. [10]
By 2000, Mugabe had adopted a sustained ‘campaign of terror’ to maintain power – consequently forcing many citizens to flee his oppressive rule and thus systematically destroying what was once considered one of the more prosperous African states. [11] In response to opposition and international criticism, he threatened to heighten his violent campaign and become the “black Hitler” against any opposing forces. [12] Illustrative of this, in 2005 he carried out “Operation Drive out the Rubbish,” which involved raiding Harare’s townships, which coincidently was home to many who supported the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. [13] This raid resulted in the destruction of thousands of homes, clinics, and small businesses. With this broad spectrum of violent non-state actors and state-initiated terrorism in mind, it is useful to briefly review how the history of terrorism in Africa has had many prominent domestic and transnational dimensions.
Domestic Trends: Terrorism Continues to be Woven into Conflict Systems
A variety of socio-economic and political conditions in Africa – too many to recount here – produce grievances that have been used by militant groups to justify their recourse to violent actions. While generalizations are risky, some comparisons can be made in the way that physical terrain is used and the violent methods are employed. In terms of terrain, this includes securing a location (typically in the form of a region) that serve as an operational base to host members, plan attacks, receive support (commonly from neighboring countries) and provide a source of recruitment. As for methods, since the mid-1990s the strategic use of terrorism in Africa has been interwoven into broader conflict systems such as insurgencies, civil wars and other forms of political violence.
Applying this terrain-method approach provides us with insights into some of the more prominent rebel movements that emerged during the 1990s. For example, in the mid-1990s the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) – a rebel group in Uganda comprised of self-identified “religious crusaders” from the Muslim Tabliq sect opposing the government – carried out terrorist attacks against local civilians and internally displaced persons in particular. According to an IRIN special report, the ADF were based in western Uganda, along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here they took advantage of the terrain and local context by “setting up rear bases in neighboring Congo where they began recruiting and training fighters with the promise of money and education.” [14] This location enabled them to operate and move fluidly between Uganda and the DRC, the latter of which was suspected of providing support. Attacks varied from the use of brute force and assaults to kidnapping and hostage-taking of youths who would then be forced to assist the ADF. In the case of abductions, two notable attacks took place in 1998 – one involving the kidnapping of 30 students from the Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist College in Kasese, the other involving the abduction of more than l00 school children from Hoima district. In another, more brutal, display of terror, ADF rebels killed 80 students of the Kichwamba Technical College in the Kabarole district by setting locked dormitories on fire. [15] In all, as South African terrorism expert Anneli Botha reports, ADF’s violent campaign peaked between 1997 and 2001 with “48 explosive devices detonated in and around Kampala, killing approximately 50 and injuring an estimated 200 people.” [16] Thankfully, the government was finally able to defeat and disband the group in 2004.
In another example in Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) – which dates back to 1987 – has carried out numerous atrocities directed at civilians in its nearly 25-year campaign in the northern region. Operating as an ideologically apocalyptic Christian group opposing the central government, its modus operandi has been to use violence or the threat of violence to intimidate and instill fear in the Ugandan people and, more specifically, the Acholi tribe. Though its objectives are not always clear, the decades of indiscriminate violence with political undertones have made this group one of the more well-known rebel groups using terrorism as a method in their campaign. [17] Furthermore, it has used the structural weaknesses of its host environment to diffuse across multiple borders, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). [18] Overall, the ADF and LRA are examples of two non-state, religiously and politically motivated groups that have caused at least 10,000 deaths in their respective campaigns. [19]
Similarly, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which operated throughout much of the 1990s, was a rebel group based in Sierra Leone that sought to overthrow the government. Its membership pool and financial support blurred the boundaries between the country and Liberia, while its activities included politically motivated attacks on local communities in an effort to induce widespread fear and submission. Its decade-long policy of youth abductions to build ranks and attacks that involved cutting off hands, arms, and legs of civilians and government troops resulted in thousands of child soldiers and amputees by 2002. [20]
More recent cases of domestic terrorism have been seen in Nigeria, where political violence in the north carried out by Boko Haram (BH) has claimed hundreds of lives, while in the non-Muslim south militant gangs carried out near daily attacks on oil infrastructure and public targets until 2009, wreaking havoc on the country’s economy and making life miserable for thousands of locals. On the other side of the continent, Somalia’s situation is looking ever-more grim, with daily violence a tragically consistent part of life. Furthermore, South Africa continues to experience some periodic episodes of political violence from both domestic and regional groups. For instance, in the mid-1990s Cape Town experienced a number of bombings and attacks on popular tourist spots that local officials attributed to the organization “People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD).” Another group, Die Boeremag, claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in 2002 on transportation infrastructure and religious temples in Soweto. More recently, in the run up to the 2010 World Cup, authorities foiled a plot by extremists linked to Somalia and Mozambique to attack the event. Shortly after, AQIM issued a threat in April 2010 to target the major international soccer event. [21] However, fortunately such threats and/or plots never materialized. Pooled together, such incidents reveal some similarities to what Crenshaw observed in 1994, that terrorism in Africa is interwoven into the fabric of various forms of conflict. However, today we must also account for the increasing transnational features of terrorist activity on the continent.
Transnational Dimensions
In the last 15 years, African countries have not only struggled against domestic terrorism, they have also been challenged by the emergence of transnational terrorist groups that have used Africa as a theatre to carry out attacks against both domestic and international targets as well as to develop and maintain operations. The 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel and airplane, and attacks against UN buildings in Algeria and Nigeria offer just a few examples of terrorist attacks carried out on African soil with a distinct international dimension. In such cases, terrorists groups use the ‘softness’ of African-based targets to attack Western – primarily European and US – and international interests. According to one report, during the first decade after the end of the Cold War (between 1990 and 2002), “Africa recorded 6,177 casualties from 296 acts of [international] terrorism” on the continent. [22]
In addition, the past decade has witnessed the transformation of some domestic groups, some of whom have adopted transnational objectives. Most notably, the 2007 merger of Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, or GSPC) with Al-Qaeda resulted in the formation of the Organization of Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). More recently, the Islamist extremist group Boko Haram, based in Northern Nigeria, has been increasing its rate of domestic attacks against civilians and government targets and has also targeted the United Nations in Abuja, communicating that it is not only concerned with domestic developments but also has a broader transnational agenda. In fact, The Economist recently observed that the growth of Islamist extremist activity in sub-Saharan Africa, and Nigeria specifically, is beginning to “sound” like the Middle East. [23] According to several experts, BH associations with the broader Al-Qaeda movement seem to be strengthening, reflected by its use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombings – both hallmarks of attacks by Al-Qaeda affiliates.
Beyond transnational mergers and ideologies, the context for terrorism in Africa has also been affected by global geopolitical and economic forces. Three intersecting trends can be seen as particularly salient for understanding how the contextual aspect of the terrorism threat in Africa has evolved: financing of violent movements, actor/conflict characteristics, and the media/information sharing environment. First, while the early post-colonial period can be characterized as terrorism in the background, the Cold War marked a turning point in Africa’s conflict terrain in that the use of terrorism moved increasingly to the forefront of violent campaigns – particularly for groups who received some level of support from either the United States or the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War not only resulted in the loss of foreign backing for opposing insurgent forces (Angola being a prominent example) [24], it also led to large caches of Soviet-produced arms proliferating in the region, able to supply a new generation of armed groups. What’s more, the loss of external financial backing forced armed groups to explore other opportunities to sustain and expand their operations. This included the trafficking and illicit trade of small arms as well as other materials such as narcotics and raw materials. Over the years, this domain of activity has matured into a robust and vibrant criminal trafficking network that has increasingly deepened its reach throughout Africa, fueling rebel movements and terrorist groups. [25]
Second, armed conflict has changed from being primarily inter (between) to intra (within) states, where it is not only dominated by small, diffuse rebel movements and criminal networks (Somali piracy being an example) but also by terrorist networks that exploit the weaknesses of many African states to carry out attacks that have domestic and international resonance. Increasingly, such armed non-state actors are not bounded by their terrain – indeed, their adaptability is showcased by their ability to shift, move, and, at times, change form. In addition, armed groups in Africa can avail themselves of an increasingly global network of strategic and tactical knowledge sharing among terrorists and insurgents. Innovations in terrorist weapons or attacks in one region of the world are monitored and emulated in other regions, including Africa. [26]
Third, the global media environment has undergone significant shifts in the last two decades. Information communication technologies, such as the mobile phone, have now become ubiquitous features in African society, and once out-of-reach resources (like access to the Internet) are becoming more accessible. This has implications for the external observer as well as the internal perpetrator. For the ‘outsider,’ as Joshua S. Goldstein aptly noted, “once remote battles and war crimes now regularly make it onto our TV and computer screens, and in more or less real time. Cell phone cameras have turned citizens in reporters in many war zones.” [27] For the ‘insider,’ access to technology can help with communicating between members to maintain operations and coordinate attacks. Furthermore, it allows today’s violent non-state actor to operate within and between the virtual and physical realm. Groups of all kinds are taking advantage of this globally connected media environment for their communications and strategic influence efforts. For example, according to one recent report, Boko Haram “has been waging a propaganda campaign that includes conference calls with reporters.” [28] This growing role of the media environment is also seen in the activities of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), an umbrella militant movement in the oil and gas fields abundant in the Niger Delta. During the height of its activities, between 2006 and 2009, when it carried out regular attacks on energy infrastructure, it maintained a close relationship with various media outlets – oftentimes claiming responsibility immediately following attacks. It also used its access to strategic oil and gas resources, and the Nigerian government’s inability to protect them, as a platform to air its grievances and communicate demands.
These are just some of the many transnational dimensions which have influenced the evolution of terrorism in Africa. They will no doubt be familiar to many readers of Perspectives on Terrorism, as the same dimensions are intertwined with terrorism threats in other parts of the world. In sum, terrorism in Africa must be understood as both a domestic and transnational phenomenon. It follows that the response to terrorism in Africa must involve a combination of both domestic and international efforts.
Domestic and International Dimensions of the Response to Terrorism in Africa
The contexts for combating terrorism in Africa, both in its domestic and transnational forms, have changed in recent decades. Scholars and policy makers have increasingly recognized the limitations of a typical African government’s ability to effectively combat a sophisticated domestic terrorist threat – particularly one with transnational linkages. Scores of books, articles and reports have been published in the last decade, focusing on the theme of security challenges in “weak”, “failing” and “fragile” states – terms meant to reflect the poor capacity of most formal government institutions. Often, these weak states are described as having “ungoverned spaces” or “lawless areas” within their borders. In an extreme case like Somalia, the complete absence of a viable central government suggests that an entire state is “ungoverned.” The US National Intelligence Council has described “failed or failing states” as having “expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective government control.” [29] A recent report by the American Security Project describes how “the challenge of ungoverned spaces remains a core issue in the management of the threat posed by transnational terrorism. A lack of government capacity allows terrorist groups to find sanctuary.” [30] African countries feature prominently in the annual Failed States Index, published jointly by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine.
At the same time, however, there is an emerging consensus in the scholarly community that local non-state actors can and often do play a critical role in confronting the efforts of armed groups within their communities. For example, senior leaders of the Sufi Islamic community in Nigeria have roundly condemned the violent actions of Boko Haram. Many kinds of non-governmental entities – informal power structures, such as ethnic groups, clans, religious sects or tribal systems – can provide services, help mitigate grievances, and in some cases, address local threats to human security. [31] Indeed, the sobering reality is that while many military and law enforcement bodies in African communities and urban centers have the potential to strengthen over time, they still have a long ways to go due to institutional constraints and economic limitations. However, this apparent state weakness does not imply that African communities are without policing. In fact, according to a study carried out by the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) Foundation, non-state actors – in the form of bodies such as ethnic associations, religious organizations, neighborhood groups, etc. – undertake local policing duties that embrace and understand cultural factors and traditions. [32] Granted, non-state policing is not without its problems and challenges (due to issues of transparency, occasional abuses, etc.) but such local capacity could be further developed and used to strengthen local police efforts to combat criminal activity in whatever form it comes. In other words, while states in Africa may lack strong formal institutions, if there is a security-conscious and pro-active local community, terrorists will not find operational freedom or safe haven.
In terms of the transnational dimensions of the threat since 9/11, the past decade has shown an increasing willingness by the U.S. and other Western countries to fund joint training exercises and other initiatives meant to foster cross-national collaboration in countering terrorism. Perhaps more importantly, we are also seeing an increasing willingness among African nations to participate in these initiatives. This often includes sending bright and promising young security professionals to Western-sponsored seminars as part of a long-term commitment to improve regional capacity for understanding how to effectively address the threat of terrorism. Of course, building relationships of mutual trust requires time and consistent effort. For this reason, one of the hallmarks of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Counterterrorism Fellowship Program over the past decade is that it has built mutually beneficial relationships with foreign military and intelligence officers, and has provided a technology-aided infrastructure through which these professionals can stay connected and maintain those relationships across the huge African continent.
Confronting the threat of terrorism anywhere requires at least a rudimentary level of local political will and security capacity, particularly in terms of intelligence and law enforcement. In Africa, outside intervention has sometimes been necessary for bolstering a state’s capabilities in these areas. In this respect, the United Nations has made some strides in assisting African states develop the appropriate legal frameworks and institutional capacity to address issues such as terrorist financing and money laundering. However, terrorism (whether of domestic or foreign origin) is a particularly contextual phenomenon, requiring a specific, context-aware response. Understanding the diversity of these contexts, an objective of this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism, is thus a critical asset to formulating effective counterterrorism research and policy agendas for Africa in the 21st century.
The Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism
Collectively, the depth and breadth of Africans’ experiences with political violence can be overwhelming to any researcher of security studies. Thus, a considerable challenge in assembling this special issue has been selecting a handful of representative themes and topics for inclusion. Our task has been further complicated by the fact that incidents of political violence are taking place throughout the continent on a daily basis, in some cases altering the contexts that inform academic analysis and rendering some research perspectives quickly “old news.” We have nonetheless attempted to capture an academic snapshot of the current state of affairs in Africa, with articles that address various kinds of terrorism and political violence in different regions of the continent.
In northern Nigeria, Boko Haram (BH) has been ramping up its violent campaign against the local Nigerian state, raising alarm bells in the U.S. and in other Western countries. However, it was not long ago that Nigeria’s woes were mainly in the southern oil-producing region, known as the Niger Delta. Thus, in the first article, Ibaba Samuel Ibaba returns to the evolving nature of political violence in the Niger Delta, with a particular focus on the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). He describes how the history and ideology of militant groups in this region, rooted in legitimate grievances over environmental destruction and governmental neglect, formed the basis for the emergence in 2006 of MEND as an umbrella organization. MEND’s violent tactics – including hostage taking, attacks on oil infrastructure and the placement of bombs and other explosive devices in public places – can clearly be described as terrorism. Nigeria is also the focus of the following article, by Isaac Sampson and Freedom Onuoha, which explores the government’s attempt to enact new anti-terrorism legislation since 2006. In their view, violence caused by militant groups in the Niger Delta and by the northern Islamist group Boko Haram clearly warranted some kind of formal response to the threat of terrorism. However, only international attention resulting from the failed attempt by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to bomb a U.S. commercial airliner proved to be the final catalyst for the National Assembly to adopt new legislation that should enable the government to confront more effectively the threat of terrorism.
The next two articles examine Al-Qaeda’s relationship to events and evolving contexts in Africa. First, Alex Wilner examines how the so-called “Arab Spring” impacts on the local resonance of Al-Qaeda’s ideology in North Africa. In his view, Al-Qaeda’s violent narrative has come under immense pressure, following the toppling of Arab regimes by largely secular and peaceful protest movements. Further, the death of Osama bin Laden has diminished Al-Qaeda by eliminating a charismatic and unifying figure who had attracted a small but lethal following in the Muslim world. Yet, the author notes, these events are unlikely to impact the aspirations, tactics, or strategies of Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate groups, notably Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Somalia’s al-Shabaab.
In his article, James Forest notes that Al-Qaeda faces a variety of steep challenges in its attempt to influence local populations in sub-Saharan Africa. While the historical record suggests that Salafist jihadi terrorists have attempted to establish a foothold in various regions of the subcontinent, they have largely failed, with the exception of tenuous links in the Horn of Africa. Despite the wealth of conditions that in other parts of the world have sustained the resonance of Al-Qaeda’s ideology, beyond North Africa there is no sub-regional coalescence of jihadists – comparable to AQIM – elsewhere in Africa. Further, while various leaders of the global terrorist network have expressed an interest in West Africa, and particularly Nigeria, there has not yet been much evidence that local Islamist groups are interested in establishing a formal affiliation with Al-Qaeda, which is surely good news for the U.S. and others in their fight to eradicate this pernicious global terror threat. However, ongoing investigations into the recent spate of attacks by Boko Haram suggest that this local Islamist group maybe receiving some tactical or operational expertise from members of the global Salafi-Jihadist movement.
Next, Annette Hübschle examines the critical linkages between organized crime and terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. She describes how perceived weaknesses in the criminal justice sector, limited law enforcement capacity, political and systemic corruption, poor border patrol and weak anti-terror and organized crime laws are believed to provide an ideal environment for the terror-crime nexus to flourish. However, her research on organized crime in Southern Africa found no strong empirical links between criminal and terrorist organizations, suggesting that these widely-held perceptions are not always supported by facts.
Finally, Victor Ojakorotu explores the kinds of armed conflict and violence that have occurred in the Cabinda region of Angola over the last two decades, with particular focus on the actions of the leading secessionist group, the Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). As the main oil-producing region in Angola, the Cabinda province is of central importance to the government, and thus demands for independence by FLEC or other local groups are unlikely to bear fruit. Further, he notes, the violent actions of FLEC have threatened the country’s economic security, and have allowed Angola’s government to portray the group as terrorists. As with Professor Ibaba’s article on militant groups in the Niger Delta, this case study offers useful insights on the dynamics of oil-related violence in sub-Saharan Africa.
Together, the articles are meant to whet the reader’s appetite for further study in a continent that is unfortunately rich with topics for security studies research. Eric Price encourages and facilitates this by offering a stellar bibliography of recommended resources on terrorism and political violence in Africa. Our sincere gratitude is extended to all the contributors for their hard work and commitment to this effort. We welcome correspondence from readers of this Special Issue of Perspectives on Terrorism.
About the Authors:
James J.F. Forest, Ph.D. is Associate Professor at the University of Massachusetts Lowell and a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. He has published over a dozen books and more than seventy journal articles and book chapters on terrorism, counterterrorism, WMD and security in Africa.
Jennifer Giroux is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. She currently heads a project that looks at targeting behaviors and characteristics of violent non-state groups with a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa.
In a June 8, 2012 file photo, President Barack Obama talks about the economy, in the briefing room of the White House in Washington.
Public disclosure would expose vast scale of “war crimes” under supposed “anti-war” president; Experts say drone use increases terror attacks
The Obama administration has moved to block the release of information relating to its overseas drone assassination programme, and will not even acknowledge that it exists, despite countless public references to the programme and the proven existence of an official “kill list”.
In a motion filed just before midnight last night, the federal government asked for FOIA requests regarding drone killings by the ACLU and the New York Times to be dismissed.
The administration’s court filing suggested that the public disclosure of such material could potentially harm national security.
“Whether or not the CIA has the authority to be, or is in fact, directly involved in targeted lethal operations remains classified,” the court filing noted.
“Even to describe the number and details of most of these documents would reveal information that could damage the government’s counterterrorism efforts,” the filing continued.
The ACLU responded with a statement slamming the move and calling it “beyond absurd”.
“The notion that the CIA’s targeted killing programme is still a secret is beyond absurd. Senior officials have discussed it, both on the record and off. They have taken credit for its putative successes, professed it to be legal, and dismissed concerns about civilian casualties,” said Jameel Jaffer, ACLU deputy legal director.
“If they can make these claims to the media, they can answer requests under the Freedom of Information Act. The public is entitled to know more about the legal authority the administration is claiming and the way that the administration is using it.” Jaffer added.
The president has referred to the programme several times in public, as have officials such as counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan.
Last month, the New York Times ran a major piece on the programme, revealing that the White House has asserted the right to carry out state-sponsored assassination anywhere in the world without having to provide any evidence or go through any legal process.
Furthermore, the Times revealed that Obama adopted a policy that “in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants.”
The administration merely has to state that the target is a terrorist and it doesn’t matter whether they are an American citizen or not, as we saw in the case of American-born Anwar al-Awlaki and his son, who were both killed last year.
In December, Obama administration lawyers reaffirmed their backing for state sponsored assassination, claiming that “U.S. citizens are legitimate military targets” and do not have the right to any legal protection against being marked for summary execution.
During a CBS 60 Minutes interview in January, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta revealed that Obama himself personally approves the policy to kill American citizens suspected of terrorism without trial on a case by case basis.
Perhaps the real reason that the administration wants the details of the programme kept under wraps is that, as reported by Propublica recently, the programme is potentially much bigger in scope than anyone had previously thought.
The administration’s figures do not add up, they are chock full of contradictions and discrepancies, and there can be little doubt that there have been many many more civilian deaths as a result of drone attacks than have been publicly acknowledged.
Akram, who noted that US drone strikes had killed more than 1,000 civilians in Pakistan, also said “We find the use of drones to be totally counterproductive in terms of succeeding in the ‘war against terror’. It leads to greater levels of terror rather than reducing them.
Many also contend that the attacks infringe the national sovereignty of Pakistan and constitute an act of war.
In 2010, a report by Washington think tank The New America Foundation found that 32% of the more than 1,200 people killed since 2004 in Pakistan, or around 1 in 3, were innocent bystanders rather than dangerous terrorists.
Reports from 2009, drawn up by Pakistani authorities, indicated that close to 700 civilians had already perished, with just 14 wanted Al Qaeda leaders killed in the attacks.
The ACLU estimates that US drone strikes have killed as many as 4,000 people in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia since 2002. Of those, a significant proportion were civilians.
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Steve Watson is the London based writer and editor for Alex Jones’ Infowars.net, andPrisonplanet.com. He has a Masters Degree in International Relations from the School of Politics at The University of Nottingham in England.
MUTARE – More than a dozen soldiers and police officers are in trouble for eating food reserved for President Robert Mugabe during his visit to Manicaland province last week.
The food was meant for Mugabe and close members of his entourage but the security details consumed it after hunger struck.
Mugabe was in Manicaland last Friday to officially open the Chinese-owned Golden Peacock Hotel in Mutare. The Chinese are involved in massive diamond mining ventures with Zimbabwe government in the nearby Chiadzwa area. Sources at Mutare Central Police Station said eight police officers and seven soldiers were arrested.
The sources, who cannot be named because they are not authorised to speak on behalf of the police, said the soldiers and police officers had been assigned to guard the presidential helicopter but ended up helping themselves to meals in the aircraft.
President Mugabe receives essence from Master Hui Kai at Jinan Buddha Temple in Chiadzwa
The helicopter had been left at an airstrip near Mutare Teachers’ College, which is a stone’s throw from the newly-built Chinese hotel. “They devoured the meals and the offence was only discovered when pilots to the presidential helicopter returned,” said the source.
“Upon being asked by the pilots where the food had gone, one of the soldiers spilled the beans and implicated 14 others,” said a source. Another insider said the soldiers were held in police custody for two nights from last Friday and released on Sunday.
The policemen implicated in the food case were freed on Monday although internal disciplinary measures could follow. Acting Manicaland provincial police spokesperson Enock Chishiri said the matter was out of his hands and could only be handled by his superiors in Harare.
“I cannot comment on that one. Speak to Chief Superintendent Andrew Phiri,” said Chishiri. Phiri was not answering his phone when the Daily News tried to get a comment yesterday.
There have been numerous reports of soldiers and policemen fainting on national events due to hunger and fatigue, while army chiefs have routinely complained of food scarcity at barracks.
Blood continues to flood the streets of Kaduna/Kachia in Kujama, headquarter of Chikun Local government Area of Kaduna state for six [6] consecutive days following the multiple bombings of Christian places of worship on Sunday June 17, 2012 in southern Kaduna. Information available to 247ureports.com indicates that the shoot at sight order given to the men of the joint task force [JTF – operation yaki] may have resulted to shooting death of six [6] men of Christian origin and natives of Kujama by a Fulani military man stationed along Kaduna/Kachi road – including 12 others that sustained injuries.
The team of men from Operation Yaki had been dispatched to the vicinity of Kijama today Thursday June 21, 2012 following the bloody riot at the Kujama market place yesterday Wednesday June 20, 2012 that saw the death of estimated 10 people, both Muslims and Christians. The security forces were charged with returning peace to the community – and a ‘free-hand’ to shoot at sight.
According to community leaders and eyewitness reports, the security forces acted in a manner depicting attempts at executing judicial killings. As gathered, one of the military men suspected to be of Fulani in origin “took it upon himself” to enter into homes to fish out people at will. And those who attempted to escape during the fishing out exercise “were fired upon”. A Christian cleric who did not want his name mentioned said the Fulani soldier has been identified. He lamented that the soldier knows that the community is under curfew and the residents of the community were indoors. “But this soldier has been going to people houses, dragging them out while those who attempted to run he opened fire on them”, lamented the cleric.
The Cleric laments that if the government fails to checkmate the continued excesses of the security forces staged in Kugama that it might result to another crisis of reprisal attacks from the Christian youths. He pointed accusatory fingers at the Kaduna State police commissioner who had told the media that the fracas at Kujama community had been quelled.
The traditional rulers, on their part, are seeking for the withdrawal of the suspected military personnel from Kujama before more natives of Kujama are gun down.
Meanwhile, in a related development, an estimated 2,010 victims of the recent Kaduna sectarian crisis received relief items from the National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA] today June 21, 2012 at three Internally Displaced Camps at Nigerian Air force [NAF] Base, NDA Ribadu Cantonment and Dallet Barracks in Kaduna. The relief materials consistrf of 350 Bags of Rice, 40 bags of sugar, 140 jerry cans of cooking oil, 1500 blankets, 700 mattresses 800 mats 1400 plastic plates, 400 buckets, 200 pieces each of cups and spoons for the IDP’s in the camps.
The crisis engulfing the All Progressive Grand Alliance [APGA] saw a cantankerous siege at the outside premises of the APGA secretariat in Wuse 2, Abuja today June 21, 2012 as would-be protesters gathered at the entrance of the secretariat to protest against the continued chairmanship of the embattled chairman of the party, Chief Victor Umeh. Information made available to 247ureports.com indicates the embattled chairman who through his reaching contacts within the Nigeria Police Force [NPF], used the men of the police force to forcibly dispatch protesters – had been suspended by the National Working Committee [NWC] of the party last week – and thus barred from entrance into the party’s secretariat.
Today at the party secretariat
The activities of today tossed a new twist to the already wrinkled affair. As the embattled chairman gained entrance into the party’s secretariat, it was reported that he held a meeting with some of his National Executive Council [NEC] – and at the end of the meeting, they reached resolutions that further threw a wrench to the already soiled party affairs.
As a caveat, the NWC suspension of Chief Victor Umeh and the National Secretary of party, Dr. Shinkafi – was followed the announcement of an acting National Chairman [Alhaji Sani] and an Acting National Secretary [Dr. Ifedi Okwenna]. The newly appointed officials in acting capacity were believed to have received the mandate of the NWC and that of a suspended chieftain of the party, Chief Nwaobualor. But Chief Victor Umeh and loyal followers within the NEC countered the suspension move by holding their version of a closed door meeting at the Secretariat to resolve on the suspension of the acting National Chairman and Secretary from the party. As a result, the APGA party paroles two suspended national chairmen and two suspended national secretaries – with each laying claim to the party secretariat – as true indication of the rightful faction with the true mandate of the party.
For this reason, the APGA which the late Ikemba Nnewi grandfathered as the main party for the south easterners dances on a limbo tattered by the unholy mechanizations of “latter day” politicians at the doorsteps of lunacy. As independent inquiry conducted by 247ureports.com reveals what appears more complex than what meets the eye. Particularly, the popularity enjoyed by the APGA following the landmark victory at the polls by the Anambra State Governor, Mr. Peter Obi to mark a second term at the seat of governor – and the disarray of the Peoples Democratic Party [PDP] in the south eastern geo-sphere – served the APGA as a virgin bride to many would-be candidates and would-be political godfathers. Personalities such as the governor of Imo State, Mr. Rochas Okorocha, a shabby oil mogul, Mr. Ifeanyi Uba, Prof Dorothy Akunyili, a shady politician, Uche Ekwunife and others moved in for the ‘purchase’ of political real estate within the party. Adding accelerant to the scramble for APGA is Governor Peter Obi’s expected exit as the governor of Anambra State in 2014 – and the import and/or implications of Ikemba Nnewi’s death.
The normally loyal party national chairman to the State governor of Anambra – which was at the time the sole elected office holder under the APGA banner – lost his loyalty to the new inductees into the party – persons such the governor of Imo State and other new financiers of the party – such financiers as the likely hopeful aspirant for the gubernatorial seat in 2014, the oil mogul from Nnewi, Ifeanyi Uba. A source close to the embattled chairman told our correspondent that Ifeanyi Uba had been promised/assured the gubernatorial ticket under the APGA banner by Victor Umeh against the 2014 elections – without due consultation to the present APGA governor of Anambra State who was a sole financier of the party.
With the new scramble for the party, the chairman armed with his new financiers found new embodiments and fortifications to chance wrestling away the structure and control of the party completely from the governor of Anambra state and the foundation stakeholders of the party. This move on the part of Victor Umeh brought him head on with the governor of Anambra State – as he was asked to account for the N20million paid into his Bank Account on a monthly basis for the upkeep of the party – and for the monies collected from the aspirants against the promise of an APGA ticket. In return, Victor Umeh threatened to open a can of worms of the Peter Obi administration. The embattled chairman never made true on his threats.
Nonetheless, further inquiry showed that the governor of Imo State, Rochas Okorocha whose presidential aspirations is no secret, has reached ‘soft’ agreements with the embattled chairman of APGA for mechanizations that will assure the conditions to set the ball rolling against 2015 are put in place now – such as wrestling total control of the party away from Anambra State. This is because the Imo State political players see the governor of Anambra State as a possible threat against 2015 presidential aspirations of Governor Okorocha – and have invested heavily on Victor Umeh’s quest to stay alive politically in his veiled battle against the Anambra political block.
Authoritative sources within the presidency have however revealed to 247ureports.com that the president’s attention has been aroused toward the unfolding scramble for APGA – particularly the presidential aspirations of the governor of Imo State, Rochas Okorocha. As learnt, the presidency is uncomfortable with the aggressive manner the APGA structure is being engineered away from Gov Peter Obi – an honorary member of the National Economic team. Our sources reveal that Mr. President has decided to throw his weight on the APGA imbroglio to ensure the status quo remains. A new party secretariat, as gathered, has been pledged by Mr. President to the party – along with other pertinent resources to enable the party operate without the undue control of Victor Umeh, Governor Rochas Okorocha and their loyalists.
Roman Catholic bishops are peeved with President Obama. Will it matter in 2012?
The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops is launching a “Fortnight For Freedom” campaign Thursday to protest the Obama administration’s requirement that all employee health plans – including those of religiously affiliated universities and hospitals – provide birth control to their employees.
Roman Catholic Church leaders believe the mandate is an assault religious liberty, and have brought their case to the pews with the hope of mobilizing parishioners to lobby Congress to overturn the rule. Polls show their efforts are resonating among some Catholics, but may be turning away just as many, muddling the movement’s impact on the 2012 election.
Catholics are generally thought of as a swing voting group, veering by no more than 4 percentage points in support for Democratic presidential candidates in elections since 1976. But their swings closely resemble those of the public overall, bringing into question any religiously-related voting by the group – they could simply be moving with national tides.
The concerted effort by national leaders to challenge Obama could give Catholics a religious reason to vote against him — if they agree with said leaders. Polls this year show this is far from a given.
Fewer than four in 10 Catholics (38 percent) said the right of religious liberty is being threatened in America today, while 57 percent said it was not, according to a March Public Religion Research Institute poll.
Catholics overwhelmingly supported a broad birth control requirement in a March Washington Post-ABC News poll, 62 to 37 percent. When asked specifically about religiously-affiliated institutions that oppose birth control, Catholics split 48 percent in favor of a requirement, 51 percent against.
The poll found a chasm between Catholics who attend Mass each week and those who don’t . Fully 68 percent of weekly attending Catholics opposed the birth control requirement for religiously affiliated institutions, while 62 percent of those who attend less often supported the mandate. The divide is far from new: Obama narrowly lost weekly-attending Catholics in 2008, but beat McCain by 58 to 40 percent among those who attended less often, according to exit polls. Reactions to the mandate may simply reinforce this trend.
To be sure, there’s little good news for Obama in a public challenge to part of his signature health-care overhaul legislation, especially from spiritual leaders of such a large voting group. Nevertheless, the lack of unity among Catholics on an issue their national leaders are pushing strongly hints that it will have little impact on the 2012 election.
Just hours after the U.S. State Department listed the leaders of the dreaded Boko Haram Islamic terrorist sect as terrorist it was revealed the one of the leaders of the sevt ranked as number 4 had been killed. The U.S. is known for using unmanned drone airplanes to kill terrorist’s leaders and with the declaration the same practice could extend to Nigeria.
The member of the Islamic terror group, Boko Haram, Habeeb (Habibu) Bama from Borno State and the mastermind of the bombings of UN Building, Force HQ Abuja, Madalla and Abacha Barracks has been Killed.
A Citizen advocacy group, Hope For Nigeria, was informed this afternoon that Bama was killed in Shot-out with the Nigerian security in Yobe state.
Habeeb Bama was declared wanted by the SSS last year and was on the top Rader of the security Unit.
The full statement on the declaration by the U.S. State Department on Boko Haram leaders read as follows;
“The Department of State designated Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar, and Khalid al-Barnawi as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. Shekau is the most visible leader of the Nigeria-based militant group Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, commonly referred to as Boko Haram. Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kambar have ties to Boko Haram and have close links to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.
“Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in northern Nigeria, its primary area of operation. In the last 18 months, Boko Haram or associated militants have killed more than 1,000 people. Boko Haram is credited with the August 26, 2011 attack on the United Nations building Abuja that killed at least 23 people and wounded scores more. Boko Haram also claimed responsibility for the December 25, 2011 attack on the Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Nigeria, that killed at least 35 and wounded dozens more. Boko Haram’s deadliest violence occurred on January 20, 2012 in Kano, Nigeria, with a series of attacks that killed more than 180 people. Boko Haram’s victims have been overwhelmingly civilian.
“The designation under E.O. 13224 blocks all of Shekau’s, Kambar’s and al-Barnawi’s property interests subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with or for the benefit of these individuals. These designations demonstrate the United States resolve in diminishing the capacity of Boko Haram to execute violent attacks. The Department of State took these actions in consultation with the Departments of Justice and Treasury.”
Those who mean well for Abia State without any form of bias will certainly confirm that Governor Theodore Orji is working hard. He is working hard in his own way and will always be captured in-between deceptions that have surrounded his-led government and governance. He is working hard in making sure that there is no change in all ramifications in sight in the state.
The ‘new dawn’the Orji-led government of Abia State boasts of is make-believe. Our people have told him pointblank that nothing has notably changed and that he is not doing what he is elected for. Orji reportedly, even agreed to this, in a report of June 5, 2012, that he was a failure in the state, perhaps to draw our people’s sympathy. This was when our people cried out loud that they didn’t see any significant dividends of democracy in his first term.
Is he not working hard in Abia State? What are we talking! Yet, Orji-led government has refused to turn a new leaf. There is hardly any state in Nigeria that will win a trophy in infrastructural decay should there be anything like that, except Abia State. The second term is just a storm in a cup of tea. Everything is evaporating without any grip of anything except mis-governance, which our people are enduring with shame, as if they are not the real owners of the state. Why must they be subjected to this type of rudeness and mindless treatment by the Orji-led government?
Is Orji not working hard when criminal elements have overrun the state? The state today is webbed in man-made controversy and crises. But he would tell those who cared to listen that he and the wealth of the state were held in complete bondage as the reason he failed in his first tenure. But this is far from the truth because any greedy person would also be greedy with lies. The truth is that he wanted to govern the state the way people could see today; hence he labeled his estranged political mentor with all forms of unprintable things. Was the state not working before his greed manifested? What are we seeing today? A total collapsed state. Bunkum!
If not greed, how could a sitting governor say that he envisions to laying a new foundation for a new Government House? Is he ruling from his house? This is one of our people’s speculations. Is the envisagement he has been boasting about, which is to lay a new secretariat complex and a conference centre, the immediate need of our people? He forgot that a place like Aba has not been receiving a facelift, but here is the government envisioning frivolities.
Orji collaborated with the Federal Government and moved troops led by Major General Sylvester Audu to kill the ‘kidnappers’ then that heralded the state, but has refused to restore security. They have crumbled the entrepreneurial spirit once known of Aba. Virtually all the wealthy people – our brothers and sisters and visitors residing or doing business – in the state have relocated to other states where there is sanity. Not Abia State! Aba is not secured, as against the swagger by Orji that people have returned to normal business and investment in the area and in the entire Abia State. Orji will not tell Nigerians that the confidence of these people who ran away is still elusive because Orji can’t be trusted. He refused to place ‘his’ troops at Umuahia his home town, but at Ohafia. Hope you know whose town is Ohafia? If you do, you will then know what we are talking about that Orji is sectional.
Every day, we read on the papers that Orji is wooing investors without us seeing any investor. Investors, especially from overseas show interest to come and invest in Abia, but on hearing the true story of the state as where they could be kidnapped and suffer infrastructural decay, they change their contact addresses, so that the state government would not contact them again. Those who have shown interest only centred their focus on oil and gas. And you ask yourself, why not on other sectors. This is the situation in the state today, but Orji would always say the contrary to massage his drowned ego.
It has been hope upon hope, promise upon promise, to boost the hoodwinking politics he is playing in the Abia State without any action in sight. It has become a recurring decimal of Orji to be saying that he has opened cooperation with a South African Brewery to renew the declining Golden Guinea Breweries in Umuahia and an Irish company to invest in the abundant quarry industry in Abia State and that the officials of the company, Quarry, Roads and Mining Unique Services Limited (QRM), have visited the state and held business talks with him. Hooey!
But is this not the same government in August last year that took a decision and sent all non-indigenes (and suspended some senior officers of the Local Government system, mainly the treasurers and in February, sent packing about 8 commissioners, the 17 Local Government Transition Chairmen and some other senior aides in its employment) to their various states that is now saying that it is going to bring in foreigners that would work in the state? Are foreigners not non-indigenes? Is this action well received? Did you say a sinking governor in his-made sinking ship? This was not how it was, it is a fresh foundation laid by Orji.
— Odimegwu Onwumere, Poet/Author, Media/Writing Consultant and Motivator, Founder of PoetAgainst Child Abuse (PACA), Rivers State.
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, on June 21, 2012, arraigned Engr. James Adeojo before Justice Bilkisu Aliyu of Federal High Court, sitting in Abuja on a 24 count charge for fraud and obtaining money under false pretences to the tune of over fourty-five million naira.
Three other suspects, including Apostle James Emmanuel David are at large.
One of the charge reads “That you James Adeojo and others now at large on or about the 26th day of October 2011 at Abuja within the Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court of Nigeria did with the intent to defraud obtain the sum of N10,200,000 (ten Million, Two hundred Thousand Naira only) from one Christiana Momah under the false pretence that the money was required to deliver a consignment of goods to her, which you know is false and thereby committed an offence contrary to section 1 (a) and punishable under Section 1 (3) of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 2006”.
Trouble for Adeojo started when Christy Ifeoma Momah alleged in a petition to the Commission that sometimes in July 2011, she was approached by one of her friends, Mrs. Regina Atanu who earlier lived with her in Benue State and introduced Pastor James Emmanuel David to pray for her sick daughter.
According to the petitioner, the said pastor called her to confirm if she was around and later arrived with one Biodun whom he introduced to her as one of his UK based client who wanted to invest in hospitality business in Abuja and needed her advice. After a week, Momah said she was called and told that she had a consignment to pick up. And they agreed, with Biodun, to meet at Women’s Development Centre where the consignment was handed over to her.
Momah said she was later lured into making payments over ten times into their account to the tune of about N45 million and did not get any consignment. When she realized that she had been duped, she asked for a refund of her money to no avail.
When the charges were read to the accused, he pleaded not guilty to all the 24 count charge and prosecution counsel, C. C Ndubueze urged the court to remand the accused in prison pending the determination of his bail application. She also said that three of the suspects involved in the alleged crime are still at large.
But defence counsel, Ajayi Olowo told the court that the offence for which his client is charged is bailable and therefore urged the court to exercise its discretion in favour of his client.
Justice Aliyu, after listening to both prayers, granted bail to the accused in the sum of N20 million and two sureties in like sum. She said the sureties must be resident in the Federal Capital Territory. She however said that if the accused failed to meet up with the bail conditions, he should be remanded in prison custody. The judge adjourned proceedings till July 13, 2012 for commencement of trial.
President Mugabe receives essence from Master Hui Kai at Jinan Buddha Temple in Chiadzwa
